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The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in 
Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. Dr 
Milan Jazbec1, member of the International Institute IFIMES, reflects and 
generalizes in his article “The Integration Process as a Tool of Stability and 
Security in the Western Balkans” the structural consequences of the 2004 EU 
enlargement, with particular emphasis on the Western Balkans and its perspectives. 
His article is published in its entirety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The state building process in the Western Balkans has undergone three big and 
complex stages during the last hundred years. Firstly, it was during and after World 
War I, when, from the chaos and conflicts that accompanied the dissolution of both 
the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, new states emerged. Secondly, it was during 
and after World War II, when above all the political and ideological map of the region 
changed decisively. And thirdly, it was following the end of the Cold War, when 
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during and after the dissolution of former Yugoslavia (parallel with the opening of the 
then isolated Albania) conflicts prevailed again and dominantly marked the state 
building process.  
 
Generally speaking, one could to detect the following phases in the state building 
process in the region after the end of the Cold War: 
- War or major conflict, leading to war; 
- Peace agreement; 
- Postconflict social reconstruction, leading to expression of integration 
ambition; 
- Implementing this ambition (with various approaches, phases, speed and 
success, depending on a country in question). 
 
There was an obviously different security environment, created along the constant 
matrix of des-integration and destruction, in all three stages, which heavily 
influenced the nature of the state building process. However, the integration process 
and its consequences, which produce constant and demanding structural dynamics, 
have decisively marked the last stage. Currently, there are three key elements, which 
compose this process, namely integration, security and development.  They present a 
new concept of understanding trends in the post Cold War era, where both 
consuming and contributing take place rather simultaneously. Overall, social 
transformation includes on an interagency approach, and along horizontal as well as 
vertical axis, numerous actors, which continue to receive, integrate and to offer. The 
span of change is significant, decisive and encouraging.  
 
The region has – most probably for the first time in its history – a unique chance to 
achieve stability and security, through intensive participation in the integration 
process. The 2004 EU enlargement with its structural consequences presents a 
turning point in this development. We will have an analytical look at the current 
situation and its prospects through five theses.   
 
FIVE THESES    
 
First: Three major characteristics dominate the European security 
processes, namely complementarity, complexity and their complicated 
nature, all being the result of horizontal and vertical dynamics of 
interests of various actors as well as their output.  
 
Complementarity is seen as the dominant feature. Lessons learned from past 
European history show that security could only be achieved through complementary 
activities of national and international subjects. If such an approach seemed to be 
primarily theoretical only a few years ago, the latest scope of activities and 
cooperation within major international organizations (the UN, NATO, the EU, the 
OSCE, the Council of Europe /CoE/) illustrates the way to proceed. At least two 
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reasons bring these players closer on the complementarity basis. Because of the 
limited pool of resources even the biggest actors cannot withstand an increasingly 
higher scale of activities. Also the complex nature of contemporary security threats 
and conflicts shows that it is practically impossible for a single player to develop the 
whole spectrum of mechanism for security management. Different approaches, 
various sets of mechanisms and networking must be combined and joined.  
 
Complexity derives from the presence of numerous security players on various 
vertical and horizontal levels. The presence of the UN as a global security player is 
accompanied by NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the CoE, which occupy different 
horizontal positions on a same but lower vertical level. Proceeding down the scale we 
would meet on the next level, for example, the Council of Baltic Sea States, the 
Višegrad Group, the Regional Cooperation Council etc. Many participants at various 
horizontal levels (global, regional, paneuropean, subeuropean, local etc.) form a 
security matrix, which is the most significant way how security as a goal could be 
achieved. This includes a variety of players and strengthens a multilateral approach. 
The matrix as a living model shows flexibility and offers the framework in particular 
for local players to emerge and fit in.      
 
The complicated nature of these processes seems to a certain extent to be the quite 
natural outcome of criss-crossing the first two characteristics. Generally speaking, 
this includes above all management of the relations resulting from:  
a) The overlapping of NATO and the EU members.  
b) The non-Nato EU members and vice versa.  
c) Relations of all member countries towards applicant/candidate countries to 
both organizations.  
d) Relations to third countries (PfP members and aspirants, countries with which 
both organizations have an institutionalized dialogue etc.).  
e) The decisive role of relations between the EU, the USA and the Russian 
Federation. 
 
This sometimes produces non-transparent activities and unnecessary overlapping, 
which is not always easy to overcome, as well as opens maneuvering space for non-
integration interests. Such situations should be avoided as a matter of a clear and 
necessary consensus on a general level, while introducing rules of engagement on 
lower levels. This would be even more important to bear in mind since European 
security processes form a fundamental part of the integration process as a whole.   
 
Second: The integration process is the key driving force of change and 
progress in Europe. It results in a broad, dynamic and complex process, 
where participation of governmental, non-governmental and private 
sector is necessary.  
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This has fundamentally changed Europe and its state system, known from the past 
centuries, which was a constant hostage of war ambitions of political elites striving 
for military and economic dominance. Therefore, the integration process, once it has 
been adopted, works to the benefit of broader populations, improving their living 
conditions and expanding their overall opportunities. In addition, it stimulates and 
when necessary also forces political elites to move along different set of values and 
principles of policy behaviour, namely in an open, transparent manner, with 
interconnected, interdependent and bound together approach. Such a change does 
not come by itself, but is a combination of the results of changing environment and 
influence of public opinion, enabled and supported by the media. 
 
One could also claim this is the point where the post Cold War approach and its 
notion are being put to test: cooperation, trust and transparency. Enriched with 
solidarity, this is the formula which not only the EU and NATO but also other 
organizations try to put forward to the new members and aspirant / candidate 
countries. This change is from one point of view stimulated by the integration process 
and from another point of view it effects further provision of security and stability 
through integration. It is also possible to say that the change itself reflects / is being 
reflected in a safer and more secure international environment, which directly results 
in further development and well-being of nations and people. 
 
The EU accession process presents an overall structural transformation of a country, 
following the acquis communitaire and focusing primarily on structures and values. 
The free passage of goods, services, capital and people as well as knowledge is a 
stimulus, which attracts broader populations. Therefore, political elites have to create 
conditions where such goals would be achievable. This is of primary importance in 
the countries of the Western Balkans, since there is a shortage of political 
programmes, which would compete for enhancing change along the integration 
process and its benchmarks. Also, the EU from its side shall proceed firmly towards 
the visa liberalization for the Western Balkans societies, enabling above all the young 
population and business community to reach a higher level of mobility and 
competitiveness in comparison with their counterparts around Europe.   
 
The efficiency of the integration process lies also with its enlargement. For this 
reason the enlargement policy shall be supported and stimulated both in the EU and 
in the Western Balkans. The former has to promote it, since the enlargement process 
is also the continuation of the European peace project that started right after the 
World War II, and the latter has to grab the opportunity with more enthusiasm, for 
the sake of all generations. This would further transform our societies and decrease 
the level of uncertainty, which we live in. 
 
Third: The Western Balkans countries are firmly bound in a network of 
various integration instruments, which have a necessary potential to 
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bring the region deeper in the overarching integration interdependency 
as well as away from historical disruption. 
 
Currently the region is practically part of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements network, which has been primarily accomplished during the few 
previous Presidencies of the EU Council, the Slovene one in particular. Spanning 
from the two candidate countries to the country at the very beginning of the whole 
process, the intra-regional dynamics has reached a level, where during the next 
mandate of the European Parliament a decisive break-through could be 
accomplished. Both the EU and the countries of the region share a huge mutual 
responsibility for this endeavour. 
 
However, there is still a strong need that the countries concerned definitely turn away 
from conflict and reach for cooperation as well as from various forms of aggression 
towards consensus building. History shall not be forgotten, but it also shall not 
stimulate the regeneration of old samples of political behaviour anymore. The most 
important basis of the whole Euro-Atlantic integration process, stemming from its six 
decades of experience, derives from exactly this message. One could present this 
finding with even more enhanced and broader wording: the structural and 
substantial importance of the integration process, which has transformed the 
European state system, presents the most efficient tool for stability and security in 
the Western Balkans. 
 
As far as the future development of state building in the Western Balkans as a part of 
its integration ambition is concerned, there is a clear need for: 
- Definite, full and complete Europeanization of the region. 
- Elaboration of the EU requirements supported with clear perception what this 
means not only for region’s elites but in particular for its population and 
individuals. 
- Expressing of the needs of the region.   
 
Hence, a clear, worked out and efficient approach for each country and for the region 
as a whole should be developed. Enlarging the EU and NATO, through their tools, is 
the final structural goal. This goal would, after is has been achieved, turn into a 
means for further development of the region as an indispensable part of the 
European entity.  
 
The security of the whole region is continuously being enhanced, strengthened and 
transformed. One could follow this principle from the provision of hard security 
primarily during the late 90-ties to the provision of soft security afterwards. Hard 
security is only one of the elements or aspects around which flexible, creative and 
firm security matrix has been developing. Security is being spread through institution 
building process and progressed – to say so – along the premises of introducing, 
understanding, implementing and enhancing soft security. The integration process 
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further cements soft security, what would mean de-securitization of security in its 
traditional, Cold War approach and meaning. This matrix is highly sensible because 
of its complexity and interdependence of its elements as well as of the regional 
warfare tradition, being to a large extent the result of outside interventions.  
 
Fourth: The Western Balkans countries have to proceed along the 
integration compass with more structural ambition and firm devotion. 
The integration process stakeholders have to encourage them with 
much more invention, belief and above all with a concrete and efficient 
approach. 
 
The integration frame has been clearly set up quite long ago, although being modified 
all the time. For the Western Balkan countries this perception has been outstandingly 
visualized after the two previous EU enlargements, namely in 2004 and 2007. Since 
then the region has been practically embraced by the integration philosophy and its 
practical implications. 
 
From one point of view it is obvious and known what the membership criteria are and 
how to fulfill them. There are examples for this all around the region and these 
experiences are being shared across the region as well. From another point of view it 
is also known what the main current challenges for the countries of the region on 
their way towards the EU are: the fight against corruption and organized 
transnational crime, the rule of law, institution building, local ownership, enhanced 
regional cooperation and full cooperation with the ICTY, all of this regardless of the 
will of parts of their political elites. If the integration ambition was initiated as an 
impetus from the outside, it could plant roots also in a reflection of local needs and 
aspiration.  
 
These processes have always been a two way street in the history of the integration: 
clear expectations from the stakeholder should meet the fulfillment of asked merits 
and given promises from the aspirant. This feeds the momentum of the process and 
its dynamics as well as balances both the application and the expectation 
management. Anyway, it still looks as if the expression of integration ambition and 
implementing of this ambition harbour at different sides of the same river. 
Accordingly, a more structured ambition and firm devotion would be appreciable for 
a faster advancing along the integration path.  
 
Also, more structured and convincing encouragement should come from the 
integration process stakeholders in general. They should be constantly aware that it 
has been the enlargement of the integration ambition, which has strengthened 
Europe and brought it peace, stability and prosperity. The current global financial 
crisis should not overshadow this historical experience. Moreover, the ambition of 
the EU to finally go global should not only strengthen its institutional reform, but 
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also revitalize the enlargement ambition. Both the EU as well as the Western Balkans 
deserve it. 
 
Fifth: Slovenia has much potential to contribute to the region’s further 
development decisively. It should upgrade, complement and deepen its 
approach, in particular with combining economic exchange, 
development cooperation and cultural-educational activities on a larger 
scale. 
 
In May 2004 Slovenia, together with nine other countries, became the new member 
of the EU. These five years were an opportunity to deepen structural adaptation into 
integration process, which has additionally been strengthened and proved by holding 
the EU Presidency in the first part of the 2008. This has also upgraded the Slovene 
responsibility for the Western Balkans.  
 
Slovenia has to press for a visa liberalization system for the countries of the Western 
Balkans. Citizens cannot be victims of their political elites and their inclinations to 
either fulfillment or not of the membership criteria. Social mobility, which drives the 
integration process, cannot be hold back because of this. Along with this goes also 
keeping Western Balkans issues high and constantly on the EU agenda. Additionally, 
offering and expressing constant political support as well as lobbying inside the EU 
and its member countries should contribute to better understanding of the region 
within the integration, but also for better understanding of the EU in the region. This 
would be the best way to substitute both the enlargement and commitment fatigue 
with responsible integration enthusiasm.  
 
Moreover, various approaches should be combined and complemented, making via 
facti their output much more substantial than so far. Extensive and deep economic 
exchange and commercial activities should be structurally accompanied by 
development cooperation programmes as well as by focused and broad cultural-
educational projects, all of this at a much larger scale. More or less parallel multi-
track activities would gain on efficiency and synergy in both directions. Cultural 
centers should be mutually established and direct cooperation among local partners 
(municipalities, schools, NGOs etc.) enhanced. The role of extensive and 
comprehensive public diplomacy has hardly been touched upon. 
 
The Slovene voice is being listened to both among the member countries and among 
the countries of the region discussed; therefore its role of integration promoter has 
still much to gain and the understanding of the key role of the integration process for 
stability and security, too. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Today the integration process is undoubtedly the key driving force of change and 
progress in Europe. It consists primarily of a cornerstone importance of the 
enlargements of both the EU and NATO, supported by a variety of other integration 
impulses. Hence, the Euro-Atlantic integration is a lesson learned as well as the 
recipe for the Western Balkans, which takes this path, while the speed at which 
individual countries move to this goal depends on the success of their reform efforts. 
 
Integration membership ambition starts as a goal, which converts itself, once it is 
achieved, into a means of providing stability, security and development. This has 
been the most obvious and convincing lesson learned from the so far enlargements 
and their stakeholders, Slovenia included. It also forms the essence of the dual 
enlargement from 2004. The series of enlargements of both organizations after the 
end of the Cold War show that membership in NATO is gained first, while the EU one 
follows later on. Experiences also explain that, generally speaking, a decade is needed 
for a functional and efficient transformation that would fit within the integration 
frame. But it is the moment of achieving membership, when real business starts and 
when goals convert to means. Only in such a case, the integration tool provides 
stability and security. 
 
The combination of both the EU and NATO enlargements present an opportunity for 
spreading and cementing stability and security, where countries are bound in a 
flexible, efficient and developing network of values and structures, enhancing and 
deepening the provision of hard security with ever-growing soft security. Diversified 
dynamics among here presented security players and within here elaborated context 
origins from numerous relations and initiatives all leading to the common goal, i.e. 
the creation of a secure and safe Europe. The more these processes are 
interconnected, interdependent and complementary, the more chances they have to 
become global ones.    
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